While investigating a bit of oddity with the Skype app on Mac OS X, I wanted to capture all traffic from only the Skype processes.
But first, a little background on the issue. All DNS traffic from my systems is routed through a WireGuard tunnel. The peer endpoint at the other end runs a recursive resolver with DNS Response Policy Zones (DNS RPZ).
The issue is – that as soon as the WireGuard tunnel is disabled, Skype will try connecting to Google DNS(184.108.40.206) and www.bing.com. Perhaps Skype bypasses the local recursive resolver set on the system and sends the DNS queries for its hosts to Google DNS directly? I cannot ascertain that yet, and it warrants a thorough investigation.
I was alerted to this by Little Snitch after I refreshed the rules. A ritual that I seem to follow every few months.
Little Snitch Network Monitor contains a hidden gem. The ability to capture traffic of a specific process.
For example, by right-clicking on any process, you should see the option to Capture Traffic. That should open a terminal window prompting for the sudo password.
After capturing traffic and interrupting should result in a PCAP on the Desktop. Neat!
Update (06/08/2020) – APNIC has published this post on their blog. Robbie Mitchell from APNIC was of great help in correcting a few things and polishing the article. You can read the Part 1 on the APNIC blog here
DNS(Domain Name System) is the crucial & ubiquitous fabric of the Internet. While on the surface, users rely on accessing websites, apps, email etc underneath it’s the DNS database which provides the map for the Internet.
It’s fair to say that everything on the Internet begins with a DNS query. This means that the DNS is used for legitimate purposes and as well as abused by bad actors.
Adding a layer of security to a flat network
In the context of COVID-19, where most of us are working from home, security of the the devices & data being accessed from a hostile home network has become a major talking point over the last couple of months. The home network is atypical from an enterprise network from a security perspective and apart from its inherent flaws, it’s a flat network.
Here is a representation of a flat network design,
The constraints of a flat network are,
No segmentation of traffic – Single broadcast domain
Easy & rapid propagation of malicious traffic within the network
One of the layers of security that can be brought into a flat network at an economical cost is by leveraging DNS. Before we look into how that can be implemented, here is a DNS primer for what happens when a domain name is accessed in a network,
Shift of the recursive resolvers
In the above diagrammatic representation, the part which is doing the most heavy lifting is the Recursive DNS Server or Recursive resolver. At the very beginning of the Internet, users themselves ran recursive resolvers on the machines or in the network. This model slowly shifted to the network operators (ISP’s) offering this as a bundled, free of cost offering along with the service. And the model has moved DNS resolution further away from the user with the advent of the Cloud/Quad DNS providers. To name a notable few, Google Public DNS (220.127.116.11, 18.104.22.168), Cloudflare (22.214.171.124, 126.96.36.199), Quad9(188.8.131.52) etc.
While each of these open resolvers services promote faster dns resolution, in reality they are still further away from the user from a round trip metric. Even though all of these open resolver services use IP Anycast, the proximity to the user cannot compete with a local resolver. In obvious terms, the recursive resolver which is in the users network or even the resolver provided by the Internet Service Provider will always be closest.
The one definitive advantage that the cloud/quad DNS open resolvers provide is the availability of a large cache.